ABSTRACT International trends in airport privatisation and commercialisation have prompted claims that changes to aviation business disrupt local place attachments, social and economic activities, and planning regimes. This paper reflects on such matters with reference to a proposal for major commercial development at Hobart International Airport in Tasmania. First, we outline provisions under the Australian Government's Airports Act 1996 that exempt airport land from State and municipal planning systems, and summarise some of the criticisms levelled against the legislation. Our purpose in doing so is to highlight the point that such critique tends to divert attention from an apparent reluctance by state and local governments to embrace regional planning regimes that might have better prepared them for airport privatisation and commercialisation, and their effects on social and economic activity in adjacent areas. That discussion is then illustrated by reference to Hobart International Airport and Hansard and newspaper reports for and against one particular development there. Irrespective of the merits or drawbacks of the development, we submit that the case exemplifies a double failing of policy and legislation. The net effect of this has been to exacerbate a range of spatial anxieties: fears and uncertainty about the penetration of 'elsewhereness' and the destabilisation of belonging to place. Such failing, we suggest, may be part of a larger problem related to the question of how to properly account for local geographies of belonging and the complex and heterogeneous spaces in which planning and policy take shape and are practised.
Introduction
Among the hallmarks of neo-liberalisation are direct development and investment, the responsiveness of governments to shifting market demands and the uncertain conditions for corporate investment, privatisation and planning (Dean 1999; Murdoch 2006; O'Malley 2000) . Harvey (2006, p. 153) notes that 'corporatization, commodification and privatization of hitherto public assets has been a signal feature of the neoliberal project'. Among such assets are public telecommunications and transportation utilities (Carney & Mew 2003; Charles et al. 2007; Docherty et al. 2004; Domney et al. 2005; Graham 2004; Hooper et al. 2000; Humphreys & Francis 2002; Oum et al. 2006) . Of changes to these sectors, Graham (2002) suggests significant creative possibilities for developers and planners: the loss of cities' coherence, their unravelling, prospects for new spaces and new forms of spatial organisation.
Reporting on work conducted by Black in the 1990s, Freestone et al. (2006, p. 491) suggest that institutional 're-arrangements in the provision of transport services have been dramatic and arguably most profound in the aviation sector'. They claim that the 'leasing of Australia's capital city airports by the Commonwealth Government to private operators is a spectacular manifestation of the privatisation process carrying enormous implications for city functioning' (p. 491). Like Graham, Freestone et al. (2006, p. 492) suggest that privatisation has significant implications for 'urban spatial structure, transportation, commercial property markets, the environment and the efficacy of planning systems'. Less buoyant than Graham in their prognosis about these implications, however, Freestone et al. contend that State and local governments have no effective determining involvement in decision making related to non-aviation developments on airport lands. They suggest that these trends have been actively pursued among successive federal governments since the early 1980s, each advancing various microeconomic reforms and national competition policies affecting the conduct of planning as a form of governance (see National Competition Council 1998). The Commonwealth Airports Act 1996 (Parliament of Australia 1996) exemplifies such reforms. Gleeson and Low (2000) have suggested that privatisation renders land-use planning a servant of the market, reducing its regulatory and political scope. A corollary is that provisions for public participation characterising many planning regimes in Australia may be diminished, resulting in limited engagement with local 1 priorities, sense of place and geographies of belonging. Ultimately, this paper is concerned with such geographies. It focuses on the city and region of Hobart, Tasmania's capital, and on a 5-year process in which plans for a major private commercial development at Hobart International Airport (hereafter, the Airport) have been developed, shelved, rekindled and advanced. The original plans were to construct a 77 000 m 2 $100 million facility combining a direct factory outlet, homemaker centre, bulky goods and trade DIY centre on airport land owned by the Commonwealth which, during the late 1990s, moved to privatise such lands, enshrining that intention in the Airports Act 1996 (hereafter, the Act). The Hobart Airport complex and land were then leased for 50 years to the Tasmanian Ports Corporation Pty Ltd (Tas Ports), a registered private company fully owned by the Tasmanian Government. Services there were run by its subsidiary, Hobart International Airport Pty Ltd (HIAPL). In December 2007, the Airport was sold to a consortium known as the Tasmanian Gateway Corporation Pty Ltd (TGCPL), which secured the remainder of the original 50-year lease, options for a further 49 years at its completion, and plans for the combined facility (hereafter, DFO) (Tasmanian Government 2007) .
In what follows, we seek to understand this development in terms of geographies of belonging (Anderson & Smith 2001; Davidson & Milligan 2004; Stratford 2009 in press) and, most particularly, in relation to the idea of spatial anxieties advanced by Allon (2000) . She describes spatial anxieties as fears and uncertainties about 'place, belonging and recognition which emerge when cultural Bevilacqua 2006, p. 22) . Sometimes, however, nostalgia is also used to prop up vested interests whose own activities might otherwise have included like developments or whose own development plans will be negatively affected by change. Such observations about spatial anxieties underscore the point that the local is simultaneously contextual, a 'particular' in opposition to a putative 'global', and a site of residual or defensive reaction (Savage et al. 2005) . Graham (2002) may qualifiedly suggest that benefits and opportunities arise from place transformation via the operation of global capital, privatisation and commercialisation. In turn, others may decry such strategies. But for Allon (2000) the pressing objective is to shift attention to 'the conjunctural and conflictual relationships between these discursive sites . . . [and to] how to understand the struggle to connect identities and histories to possible futures and ways of belonging' (pp. 276Á7).
Our engagement with these ideas is tempered by an equal interest in the role of planning in place making and management. Murdoch (2006, p. 157) argues that, as an arm of modern government, planning 'can ''perform'' place'. He conceives of planning as a network of knowledge that draws 'actors and entities only selectively into its governmental framework . . . [such] that planning has considerable difficulty in ''representing'' the complex and heterogeneous spaces in which it is inevitably immersed' (p. 131). We suggest that these difficulties are evident in the case of the Airport DFO. Following a brief description of the Act and criticisms of it, we turn to examine that case, and hypothesise that ongoing failures to embrace regional planning, and continued investment in neo-liberal strategies per se, exacerbate spatial anxieties about elsewhereness, displacement and dislocation.
Governing the Airport
The Airports Act 1996 governs the lease, development and management of Commonwealth airport lands, and the protection of environmental values and aviation capacities on such lands. It creates a land-use planning and assessment regime for both aviation and non-aviation uses of land that substitutes for State and municipal systems. Building on trends evident from the late 1980s when the Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) broadened its revenue base by pursuing commercial opportunities, the Act supports airport privatisation and heightened national competition (Harman & Harman 1996; Hooper et al. 2000) .
The Act requires airports under its control to have master plans to provide directions for future development. A master plan is to specify the lessee's development objectives; assessment of projected aviation needs of airport users; proposals for development and land use; forecasts of noise exposure levels; and audits of environmental issues associated with the plan (s71(2)). It must also have regard to a 20-year planning period, but is only valid for a 5-year period before which a new version is to be approved (Australian Government, Department of Transport and Regional Services 2002, s72, s77) . Under s72(6) of the Act, 'a draft or final master plan must address the extent (if any) of consistency with planning schemes in force under a law of the State or Territory in which the airport is located'.
First, the lessee must prepare a draft master plan for consultation with government and industry, which is placed on public exhibition with a 90-day period for public submissions (Australian Government, Department of Transport and Regional Services 2002, s79) . Where public comment is received, the plan then submitted to the Commonwealth Minister for approval must certify that it: lists those who made representations; summarises the comments in those representations; states that the company has had due regard to any such comments received; and elaborates on any information specified in the regulations. As a cautionary note, we acknowledge that there is, in this arrangement, the necessary presumption of probity on the part of the lessee in appropriately 'translating' these representations, their meaning and significance. Approval of a draft master plan then rests with the Minister who, under s81(3), must have regard to: how the plan will meet requirements for aviation and the needs of other users for services and facilities; the effects of the plan on the use of land within and surrounding the airport; the consultations undertaken; the views of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and Airservices Australia; and any other relevant matters.
The Act additionally requires lessees to submit major development plans 2 for certain significant development proposals, including the construction of new buildings where costs exceed $10 million and use is not principally for passenger terminals, and for development likely to have a significant environmental impact or within an area identified as significant in the lessee's formal environmental strategy. In passing, the DFO proposal discussed below invokes both requirements. Under s91(1), a major development plan is to detail (a) an outline of the development; (b) the lessee's objectives for the development; (c) the consistency of those objectives and outline with the local planning scheme; (d) assessments of (i) how the future needs of aviation and other uses of the airport will be met, (ii) whether the development is consistent with a master plan, and (iii) likely environmental impacts; and (e) an outline of the management of identified environmental impacts.
At s92(2), a major development plan is subject to public comment in a fashion mirroring that used in the master plan approval process. The Minister may approve a major development plan with or without conditions or may refuse the plan. In doing so, under s94 the Minister is to have regard to: the extent to which the master development plan will meet the needs of aviation and other uses of the airport; the effect on future operating capacity of the airport; environmental impacts; the consultations undertaken; other matters deemed relevant; and the major development plan's consistency with the master plan.
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In the case of the DFO the HIAPL was 'acting as the proponent, the planning authority, and [would] . . . also advise the Federal Minister whether to accept the proposal or not' (McKim in Parliament of Tasmania 2006, n.p.) . How could such a situation arise? Part 5 of the Act provides a land-use planning and building-control regime in which, at s112, development of any kind is exempt from State and local government planning and building controls. The spirit of this exemption has attracted trenchant criticism typified by Spiller (2006) , who argues that nonaviation developments at Australia's airports make conflict inevitable. Implied in that one statement is a moot point that the Act is the cause of such conflict. Yet equally problematic is the existence of vested interests among State and local governments (and conflicts of interest when councils act as planning authorities), particularly given competition for investment. As Williams (2007, p. 36) notes, a net effect of sweeping reforms in governance and planning has been greater commercialisation and privatisation of planning decisions, resulting in 'adverse consequences for traditional local government functions relating to planning and the regulation of development, for participatory planning and the public interest, and for the role and confidence of the planning profession'. Spiller's argument that non-aviation developments on airport land cause considerable angst for metropolitan and regional centres parallels Allon's ideas about spatial anxieties writ large. Nevertheless, it fails to account for the fact that, in the Tasmanian case at least, local and State governments have not yet produced comprehensive regional plans nor yet invested in a substantive regional planning system that might have better positioned them to anticipate the external effects, for example, of airport privatisation and development, not least among them transport and commercial impacts on small to medium enterprises.
3 Spiller (2006, p. 14) also suggests that the 'current regime . . . does not allow proper metropolitan planning to occur when a significant metropolitan developer can operate outside the jurisdiction of proper planning processes'. The fact that airport lessees do not explicitly contribute to metropolitan planning outside the boundaries of the properties they manage may indeed be exacerbated by the narrowness of decision making that the Act permits, but this applies in other areas as well. And in terms of the process inside its borders, the Act requires stringency in many respects as demanding as local government planning regimes.
It may be the case that However, conflict and inconsistency may not be entirely one-sided. One can only speculate, as Collits (2007) does, on how conflict over airport lands and the surrounding regions could have been reduced had meaningful opportunities been made to create systems for better regional governance and planning. Among these might have been a statutory basis for regional plans; reforms to regional Spatial Anxieties and the Changing Landscapeboundaries; better horizontal and vertical integration within and between regions; the cessation of blame-shifting across tiers of government; a national framework for regional spatial planning; or metropolitan-scale governance regimes. Certainly, there appears to be an absence of substantive regional planning for the greater Hobart area; conflict over development plans for a DFO at the Airport simply highlights the effects of such a deficiency. We submit that the Act is erroneously targeted as fully blameworthy for the negative effects of non-aviation development on airport lands when larger neo-liberal forces and the failure to advance regional planning clearly pertain. This local matter, which exemplifies similar issues nationally, is now documented, mainly using discussions from the Tasmanian Parliament Hansard, interspersed with reports on the DFO reported in the local newspaper, The Mercury, identified via comprehensive searches of the Internet between early 2006 and mid-2008. Particular attention was paid to manifestations of spatial anxieties. These are often signified by expressions of angst about the possible effects of the DFO on regional transport systems; impacts on local economies in townships east of the Airport and in the CBD to its west; and about the sense of loss that Tasmania's status as a quiet backwater is being jeopardised. Identifying these anxieties also allows us to suggest the existence of larger questions about whether, how and to what extent geographies of belonging are accounted for in planning processes for non-aviation development*a matter to which we return in the conclusion.
The case of the 'big box' development at Hobart International Airport
The smallest of the Australian States, Tasmania is also known as the most marginal economy in the nation, one subject to habitual controversy about possible development futures and the means to achieve economic and social prosperity (Stratford 2006 (Stratford , 2009 in press). Among its 29 Local Government Areas is the City of Clarence on the eastern shore of the Derwent River in Hobart. The Airport is located within that municipality.
On 11 November 2005 Minister Lara Giddings announced that a $100 million 77 000 m 2 DFO/Homemaker/Bulky Goods/Trade DIY Centre would be built at the Airport (see also Australian Broadcasting Commission 2005; HIAPL 2006 ). Yet the Major Development Plan had not then been approved. An extract from the Tasmanian Government's media release is full of references to the assumed benefits of privatisation, commercialisation and competition: This is a massive coup for the state that will see 600 construction jobs created and 1,000 full and part time jobs created at the retail outlet . . . This is yet another example of Tasmania having the 'open for business' sign up in big bold letters. There is no doubt that this development will encourage Tasmanians who normally go to the mainland to shop at these sorts of outlets, to stay here for their shopping. We also want to attract people to the state for their retail therapy . . . the total area for the site is 158,582m
2 and there will be 2254 car parking spaces. The complex will increase competition within the retail trade industry and this is great news for shoppers . . . the development will not require planning approval from the Clarence City Council or the RPDC 4 because the land it will be built on is owned by the Commonwealth. However, the airport has undertaken In light of earlier comments about a lack of regional planning in Tasmania, and despite Minister Giddings' upbeat reportage and the Master Plan's vision, signs of conflict over the proposal quickly appeared. These were etched deeper when, on 8 December 2005, The Mercury newspaper reported an '$8m motel plan 6 for Hobart Airport site [that] . . . will be only a stone's throw from the planned $100 million factory outlet and homemaker centre due to open in early 2007' (Smith 2005, n.p.) . The report referred to support from Giddings, and strong criticism from the Lord Mayor of Hobart City Council, who appealed for the State Government to 'ensure the developments were subject to state planning processes' given that HIAPL was (then) a wholly owned subsidiary of a government business enterprise. Valentine noted that 'large developments not only threatened to take business away from the Hobart CBD but posed traffic, environmental and economic problems'. Among a number of reasons for this motion was the assertion that Tasmania needs discerning development but instead 'we get projects which are going to cause significant impact to our communities, to our society and, in this case, to the vibrancy and economic success of the merchants that occupy not only the Hobart CBD and the Launceston CBD 8 but also regional areas' (McKim in Parliament of Tasmania 2006, n.p.).
Of note here is the interweaving of concerns about regional economic and local social well-being, a theme repeated in the language of numerous contemporary conflicts over pulp mills in the State's north, waterfront developments in Hobart's CBD, marina developments at Ralphs Bay on the city's eastern shore, or tourism developments in central highland wilderness areas. Echoes of the Greens' observations were also evident in The Mercury just four days after their submission to the Australian Government on the Draft Major Development Plan, and the tenor of the column might equally have suited any of the aforementioned development conflicts:
. . . a monstrous mega-mall with parking for 2000 cars . . . blighting the landscape and, worse still, draining the small businesses of Hobart of their life and the city of its vivacity. Our Government is complicit in this appalling scheme. It seems not to understand what makes this state unique . . . [and it is not] some future theme-park . . . [in which the] proposed development will be about twice the size of the present CBD . . . I love this place*but even lovers are allowed to offer advice and to caution those they love against folly. (Schofield 2006, p. 4; emphasis added) Here is a lamentation about a stable topos disrupted; a legible and valued landscape lost to some 'elsewhere' theme park whose signifiers are illegible; an appeal to social responsibility in defiance of the rationalist agenda for privatisation. It is an expression of spatial anxiety writ large in development debates more generally.
Back on 30 August 2006, the then Tasmanian planning minister responded to the Greens' motion by stating that non-aviation development on airport lands should be 'subject to relevant State and Territory planning laws, policies and procedures', and declaring support for the idea that all master plans and development plans be 'subject to a review by an independent panel which assesses the proposals, including their impact on surrounding land uses, relevant local government planning schemes and infrastructure' (Kons in Parliament of Tasmania 2006, n.p.) . This support had been officially documented at the Australian Local Government and Planning Ministers Council on 4 August 2006, which resolved to convey the same message to the Commonwealth, which had rapidly rejected such submissions. The Minister suggested that the reason for the Australian Government's reluctance to relinquish planning decisions at airports 'we believe, is that the Commonwealth gets significant premiums from their [sic] leases by allowing a planning process which leaves their tenants in a position to extract maximum development potential' (Kons in Parliament of Tasmania 2006, n.p.) . It was stated that the State Government did not oppose the DFO but did have problems with the 76
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Commonwealth's position on planning. Nevertheless (perhaps given that the State was indirectly the proponent for the development at the Airport) he would not agree to make a submission to the Commonwealth, under Regulation 4.01(1a) , to have the RPDC independently assess the DFO.
9
In the debate that ensued, the deputy leader of the Opposition summarised his party's position thus:
We welcome and encourage investment coming into Tasmania and the associated economic impacts . . . in terms of the jobs created . . . however 'big box' development is a new concept for Tasmania This narrative is instructive. While noting the immediate benefits that might derive from the development, in a gesture to the traditions of social rather than economic liberalism, it conveys a sense of concern about its effects on the Tasmanian community. In galvanising this point, Minister Kons quoted the then CEO of Launceston Chamber of Commerce, who had written a submission on the development in which she argued that 'it is the high level of business ownership that provides the glue that strengthens our communities and maximises social capital. This should not be jeopardised as a result of a loophole or inadequate scrutiny of a major development' (Kons in Parliament of Tasmania 2006, n.p.; emphasis added). By oblique reference to the sheer scale of the project, the Opposition's narrative suggests an anxiety about transplanting big city ideas into a smaller regional context. Nevertheless, following party lines, he sought to amend the Greens' motion to delete reference to the immediate release of the social and economic impact study, suggesting that developers need to have confidence that they can protect information that is commercial in confidence. To gain Opposition support, the Greens accepted the amendment. On the other hand, the Planning Minister opposed the motion on the grounds that the assessment process for the development was in train with the federal minister and it would be 'ridiculous' to interrupt it; the amendment was lost.
In June 2007, first the Estimates Committee of Parliament and then the House of Assembly engaged in discussion around the sale of the Airport. On 21 June the Treasurer responded to a question about what exactly was being sold at the Airport: 'What we would be selling is the commercial opportunity that goes with that lease, and that includes all proposed developments, all the aspects of developing the land. That is, service station, motel, DFO if it gets approved' (Aird in Parliament of Tasmania 2007a, n.p.). The ensuing dialogue centred on the fact that the Plan, then with the Federal Department of Environment and Water, was soon to be sent to the then Minister Vaile for up to 90 days. Tasmanian Treasurer Aird noted that by the time all the sale requirements were in place, it was likely that the government would know whether the DFO was approved. Unofficial speculation was that the Airport would sell for $60Á70 million.
Spatial Anxieties and the Changing Landscape
Later, on 25 September 2007, it was reported in the House of Assembly that the Property Council had commissioned its own social and economic impact assessment from the Macroplan Company. It had 'found that $84 million per year will be lost in the Hobart CBD if the direct factory outlet . . . were to go ahead' (McKim in Parliament of Tasmania 2007b, n.p.). The previous day a major fire had gutted the Myer Department Store 10 in the heart of the CBD; discussion on 25 September around the effects of that fire and the impact of alternative CBDs was heartfelt. The Greens questioned the then Premier 11 about the latter's insistence that the 'CBD of Hobart would [not] be . . . even badly affected by additional retail space being constructed elsewhere in southern Tasmania' (Parliament of Tasmania 2007b, n.p.) . The Premier's doggedness on the matter was consistent with his overall approach to development proposals supported by the Tasmanian government*that change is good, that many Tasmanians are unnecessarily hostile to such change, and that they cling to a nostalgic provincialism:
We are almost getting to the stage . . . where some people think one retail shop, one fish and chip shop, one butcher and one baker and one milkman is all we need. Our State is growing and, as demand grows (Vaile 2007) . He provided no justification for the approval or conditions imposed, noting only that the decision had been sensitive to the public consultation process and concerns raised about its scale and possible impact on retail centres elsewhere in Tasmania. The Minister required the company and HIAPL to 'agree to make payment of a reasonable amount' towards road upgrading from additional uses and towards a regular bus service which, as later discussion implies, appears not to be widely known. Under Condition 26, he also required that the DFO component be reduced from 18 000 m 2 to 10 000 m 2 or by 44 per cent (Australian Government, Minister for Infrastructure 2007; Vaile 2007) . That stipulation caused the Austexx company to immediately withdraw from the project on the grounds that the reduction in floor size would compromise the financial viability of the DFO, an action which made frontpage headlines on 10 October 2007. The CEO of Austexx was quoted as saying that DFO's position has always been that the net lettable area of 10,000 square metres is not sufficient to provide for the successful format that DFO has established in five locations around Australia . . . We are not prepared to compromise on that format. That view has been communicated to the Government prior to today's decision. (Killick & Worley 2007, n.p.; emphasis added) Note should be made here of evidence of the 'elsewhereness' to which Allon (2000) refers: a standardised approach to business that has formulaic spatial expression, and which is then stamped on individual landscapes without apparent discernment or sensitivity to local context.
At that point, public discussions about the DFO diminished. Then, after the defeat of the federal, Premier Lennon announced the sale of the Airport. Later,
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E. Stratford & S. Wells the State Head of Treasury reflected on that sale in the June 2008 Estimates Committee of Parliament, noting that the divestment 'was a classic case of an asset that did not need to be owned within the government sector for which the benefit to the community of having the proceeds of the sale now to reinvest in other infrastructure far outweighed the minimal loss of revenues through the Budget' (Parliament of Tasmania 2008, n.p.) . That other infrastructure includes a new Royal Hobart Hospital*touted to cost $1 billion, and a major transportation roadÁ rail hub in the northern suburbs at Brighton. The fact that the Airport sold for $350 million*five times its expected price*was a windfall that was widely celebrated (Neales 2007) . On 14 February 2008 The Mercury reported that the DFO at the Airport was 'back on track, with construction to begin in weeks' (Smith 2008, n.p.) . The Mayor of Clarence City Council was quoted as saying that the DFO would be no more than 10 000 m 2 and acknowledged that 'the project would attract critics but he said concern was unfounded and the development would be good for Tasmania'. In its own media release, the Hobart International Airport suggested that the development would generate 1200 construction jobs and 600 full-time retail positions (Hobart International Airport News and Information 2008) . Two weeks later, a lengthy anonymous opinion piece in The Mercury suggested that Tasmanians 'Let the DFO have a go' rather than greet it with dismay that the writer thought unfounded on several (if contestable) grounds: the generation of employment; the injection of millions of dollars of investment funds; and the carrying of risk by private enterprise. Indeed, the writer argued that the 'marketplace is tough but competition breeds excellence, while banning and planning things out of existence just creates mediocrity. Think of shoppers in the old Soviet Union' (Anon. 2008, n.p.) . Such boosterism is in stark contrast to a commentary posted in the alternative Tasmanian Times online newspaper some weeks later:
Who is to say what will become of the DFOs? Clean and bright today, they face the prospect of poor winter sales and patronage . . . In the future, there is a prospect that they will fail, become deserted at night or inhabited by transients. Only relocated government departments or instrumentalities such as Aurora will cling limpet-like to their offices. Meanwhile, those who have embraced the imbecility will never be forced to face the consequences of their actions. (Nostradamus 2008, n.p.) As with so many debates about development in Tasmania, that characterising the DFO is obdurate*underscoring Murdoch's (2006) observations, noted above, that planning (indeed governance more generally) struggles to deal with complex and heterogeneous spaces.
Conclusions
Significant and protracted discussion exists about the neo-liberalisation of economic, political and social life, and about attendant practices such as privatisation and commercialisation of public assets, among them telecommunications and transportation. In the aviation sector, in particular, profound change has characterised the management of airports, including diversification of investment and activity into non-aviation developments on airport lands.
In Australia, these tendencies have been part of widespread reforms in governance spearheaded by successive Commonwealth governments, gaining expression in legislation and policy, inter alia, to control federally owned airports. In 1996, the Airports Act was passed to manage both aviation and non-aviation activities and developments, and to create the conditions for private and commercial investment. The Act appears to have a number of stringent requirements but is seen as limited in terms of transparency and accountability, and very limited in providing managers with the capacity to consider the regional effects of such activities, developments and investments.
The neo-liberal turn has been implicated in the generation of fears and uncertainties about place, about the recognition and legibility of place, and about belonging to place, especially when things, events, activities and actors previously elsewhere come to inhabit 'our' place, and tendencies to defensive nostalgia arise. Undoubtedly, the advent of the DFO at Hobart International Airport has caused significant angst for various stakeholders on several grounds related to the effects it may have on individual and collective livelihoods, transport infrastructure, inner city vibrancy, visual amenity and aesthetics, and local and modest sensibilities in relation to consumerism and consumerist landscapes. The DFO has also highlighted, we think, the point that opportunities for substantive and meaningful regional planning strategies have been missed. Had such strategies been in place when the DFO was proposed, it is possible that local and State governments would have had an anticipatory framework by which to respond more adequately to the development. Notwithstanding this observation, we suggest that the Act warrants amendment to better ensure that the exogenous and cross-border effects of nonaviation developments are discussed transparently and publicly, and that genuinely effective conversations over these possible effects are entered into if local geographies of belonging are to be valued rather than dismissed as the subjective lamentations of the disaffected.
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NOTES
[1] 'Local', here, may involve significant scalar slippage and include individual lots, streetscapes or entire metropolitan regions. In the case of Tasmania, 'local' may also mean the whole of the island State.
[2] Such development plans parallel development applications in the standard State planning system. [3] As this paper was being completed, it was announced that funding for regional planning initiatives throughout Tasmania was being allocated by the Premier, as Minister for Planning (Barlett 2008 Queensland, has an area comparative to that originally planned for Hobart but has a population catchment of 1.8 million people.
[6] This development, being less than $10 million in value, is not subject to any form of public consultation or involvement under the Act. Proposals such as these are assessed internally by the lessee against the provisions of the applicable Master Plan.
[7] The controversy was exacerbated because plans for a similar but smaller Homemaker centre 1.5 km from the Airport had been approved under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 (LUPAA) (Parliament of Tasmania 1993a) . The LUPAA is one in a suite of legislation known as the Resource Management and Planning System, or RMPS. Were the proposal to be considered under the RMPS it would be the case that, under Schedule 1, economic development should be facilitated in accordance with the sustainable development of natural and physical resources and the maintenance of ecological integrity, and the fair and orderly use of air, land and water, and the participation of the public in decision making. We say 'in principle' to acknowledge that the System in not failsafe, because demands for engagement in the global market economy often erode the legislative mandate for sustainable development enshrined not only in the RMPS but in the Commonwealth's National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development and Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, among others (Australian Government 1992; Commonwealth of Australia and Others 1992).
[8] Launceston, 2 hours' drive north of Hobart, is Tasmania's second largest city.
[9] Kons was forced to resign from his portfolio and the front bench on 9 April 2008 after it was alleged that he misled parliament about the process leading up to the appointment of a magistrate and the destruction of documentation pertaining to it.
[10] The Myer Department Store is a major retail outlet through Australia and occupied more floor space within the Hobart CBD than any other retailer. 
